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Abstract
Background. The tension between security and con-
venience, when creating passwords, is well established.
It is a tension that often leads users to create poor pass-
words. For security designers, three mitigation strategies
exist: issuing passwords, mandating minimum strength
levels or encouraging better passwords. The first strategy
prompts recording, the second reuse, but the third mer-
its further investigation. It seemed promising to explore
whether users could be subtly nudged towards stronger
passwords.
Aim. The aim of the study was to investigate the in-
fluence of visual nudges on self-chosen password length
and/or strength.
Method. A university application, enabling students
to check course dates and review grades, was used to sup-
port two consecutive empirical studies over the course
of two academic years. In total, 497 and 776 partici-
pants, respectively, were randomly assigned either to a
control or an experimental group. Whereas the control
group received no intervention, the experimental groups
were presented with different visual nudges on the reg-
istration page of the web application whenever pass-
words were created. The experimental groups’ password
strengths and lengths were then compared that of the
control group.
Results. No impact of the visual nudges could be de-
tected, neither in terms of password strength nor length.
The ordinal score metric used to calculate password
strength led to a decrease in variance and test power, so
that the inability to detect an effect size does not defini-
tively indicate that such an effect does not exist.
Conclusion. We cannot conclude that the nudges had
no effect on password strength. It might well be that an
actual effect was not detected due to the experimental de-
sign choices. Another possible explanation for our result
is that password choice is influenced by the user’s task,
cognitive budget, goals and pre-existing routines. A sim-
ple visual nudge might not have the power to overcome
these forces. Our lessons learned therefore recommend
the use of a richer password strength quantification mea-
sure, and the acknowledgement of the user’s context, in
future studies.
1 Introduction
The first encounter with a new system or service, for
many individuals, requires the creation of a password.
This authentication approach is based on the possession
of some secret shared knowledge, known only to the user
and this one system.
People are asked to provide passwords so frequently,
and inconveniently, that they end up choosing weak pass-
words, leaving themselves vulnerable to attack [30]. In
effect, password choice becomes something of an ob-
stacle to be hurdled in order to be able to satisfy legit-
imate goals. The primary problem is the fact that mem-
ory limitations tug people towards memorable and pre-
dictable secrets, whereas strong security mandates more
effort. Strength can be achieved either by using a hard-
to-remember and hard-to-guess nonsense string, or by
using a long pass phrase. Both are personally more costly
than a weak password.
Some believe that we should simply enforce strong
passwords [15] or expire passwords regularly [18]. The
problem is that neither the former nor the latter guaran-
tee increase resistance to attack [53, 57]. Moreover, re-
strictive, complex password policies aimed at mandating
strong passwords can conflict with users’ needs, increase
effort and ultimately compromise productivity and secu-
rity [24, 48, 52].
The other option is to replace the password with
something like a biometric or token-based authentication
[5, 38]. Neither of these is perfect either. No biometric
is ubiquitous and infallible [32] and tokens are expensive
and easily lost or stolen.
Other alternatives are graphical passwords, mnemonic
passwords or passphrases [1, 51, 28] but these have
not really gained widespread acceptance and even
passphrases have their flaws [29, 39].
While many focus on the password’s deficiencies, it
must be acknowledged that passwords also have advan-
tages. They are easy to deploy, accessible to those with
disabilities, cost-effective, preserve privacy and are eas-
ily replaced [6].
Instead of focusing myopically on the password
choice event, we should contemplate password creation
as one component of an entire authentication eco-system,
and consider that the end user needs more support
throughout the process. Horcher and Tejay [23] claim
that users are poorly scaffolded during the password cre-
ation process, and that this contributes to poor password
choice. Solutions that scaffold by offering dynamic feed-
back on password quality are designed to encourage de-
liberation and reflection during password creation [17].
However, such approaches have, thus far, not signifi-
cantly improved the quality of passwords [12, 17, 45].
There is increasing evidence that behaviour can be in-
fluenced through surprisingly small and inexpensive in-
terventions called “nudges” [21].
Transferring successful nudges from other areas to the
authentication context was something we wanted to test
to find out whether these would encourage users to create
stronger passwords. The hypothesis we tested was:
H1: The presence of a visual nudge will lead
to longer and stronger passwords.
We carried out a longitudinal study to investigate the
potential of eight different user interface nudges, dis-
played during password creation, calculated to influence
password choice. The contributions of this paper are:
• Details of how nudges were tested in the wild, and
the ethical constraints we encountered.
• Empirical evidence that the tested nudge conditions
did not significantly impact password quality.
• Reflection on the results and suggested explanations
for the negative finding reported by the study.
The paper concludes with a discussion of lessons
learned and recommendations for future studies of this
kind.
2 Background
A nudge can be considered a mechanism that guides indi-
viduals to make wiser choices without their necessarily
being aware of its influence [34]. An intervention can
only be considered a nudge if individuals are able easily
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to resist its influence [43]. A good example of a nudge is
the house-fly painted on urinals in an Amsterdam airport.
This nudge had the desired effect of reducing spillage,
but could equally have been ignored by urinal users.
The subtle nudge approach has proved popular with
western governments [44, 22], who have adopted nudges
in key areas such as tax and public health [50]. A small
alteration in letter text sent to individuals significantly
improved tax payment rates [21]. However, such use has
been criticized with the suggestion that nudges do not
promote long-term behaviour change [36]. Nevertheless,
this may not be an issue for use in authentication if the
motivation is to promote optimal decisions at the moment
of password creation.
There is an argument that people sometimes create
passwords unthinkingly, basically operating using their
autopilot (System 1) thinking, rather than deliberately
engaging (System 2) level thinking to choose a good
password [43]. Sunstein [41] explains that nudges can
work in tandem with educational efforts by impacting
System 1 thinking, with educational efforts targeting
System 2 thinking, thus complementing each other.
Jeske et al.. [26] demonstrated such an approach when
it came to nudging users to select the most secure wire-
less networks. They found that nudges could be effec-
tive, but that personal differences also played a role in
the security decisions. Similarly, Yevseyeva et al. [56]
experimented with nudging people towards secure wire-
less network selection using different variations of a pro-
totype application. The found a combination of colour
coding and the order in which the Wi-Fi networks were
listed to be most effective.
Nudges have also been deployed to improve deci-
sions surrounding privacy. Choe et al. [10] investi-
gated positive and negative framing of privacy ratings to
nudge individuals away from privacy-invading applica-
tions. They demonstrated that framing, as well as user
ratings, had the potential to nudge individuals towards
privacy-respecting applications. Similarly, Balebako et
al. [3] suggest that nudges can support users in making
more optimal decisions in privacy when it comes to lo-
cation sharing. They argue that individuals, left unaided,
might well make regrettable privacy decisions due to the
cognitive load caused by having to consider all possible
ramifications of a single privacy decision. Similarly, Al-
muhimedi et al. [2] investigated user awareness of pri-
vacy invasion by making usually invisible data sharing,
visible . Almuhimedi et al. demonstrated that the ma-
jority were nudged to reassess their privacy permissions
when data was presented.
Authentication nudge studies have delivered disap-
pointing results so far [12, 17]. One study attempted
to exploit the Decoy Effect [27]. This design involves
giving users three choices: one inferior, one very expen-
sive, and a middle-of-the-road option that designers want
people to choose. The decoy study [45] offered users
their own password choice, a complex hard-to-remember
password and the alternative they really wanted users to
choose: a long and memorable password. The relative
strengths of the three passwords was displayed to influ-
ence choice. The results were disappointing [45].
Another nudge effort that has enjoyed much research
attention is the password strength meter. These mecha-
nisms provide strength feedback, either post-entry or dy-
namically. Mechanisms can provide colour indicators,
strength indicator bars, or informative text [8].
Ur et al. [47] compared a number of different pass-
word strength meters and discovered that meters im-
pacted password strength. However, they tested their me-
ters using a Mechanical Turk survey. The fact that the
created passwords carried no cost might have led to re-
spondents formulating somewhat unrealistic passwords.
Ur et al.’s study was an essential first step in exploring
these kinds of interventions, giving us hope that nudges
could be designed to work in the wild too.
Sotirakopoulos [40] attempted to influence password
choice by providing dynamic feedback. No difference
between a horizontal strength meter and the compari-
son to peer passwords emerged. Vance et al. [49] also
reported that password strength meters only impacted
password strength in conjunction with an interactive fear
appeal treatment condition that included a message on
the seriousness of the threat. An interactive password
strength meter and a static fear appeal did not impact
password strength.
Egelman et al. [17] did test the impact of providing
password meters in the wild. They found that the meters
made no observable difference to password choice, un-
less users perceived the account to be important. If peo-
ple do not attribute value, then it is understandable that
the password meter makes no difference to their choice.
Privacy nudges have been more successful than au-
thentication nudges so far. Privacy choices, however, en-
tail people having a choice between two fairly equiva-
lent options [10, 26]. Nudging in authentication does not
match this pattern of use and, in fact, initial studies on
nudges in authentication have delivered mixed results, as
described above. Still, nudges have been successfully de-
ployed in other application areas, and at least two expla-
nations for the lack of success in authentication. It might
be the case that authentication is unsuited to nudging in-
fluence. On the other hand, it could be that a success
authentication nudge is yet to be discovered discovered.
Much nudging in authentication has focused on pass-
word strength meters. We thus carried out a study to
extend the evidence base by testing a number of visual
authentication nudges. We tested nudges which focus on
cognitive effects (e.g. social norms and expectation) that
have rarely been tested in the authentication context.
We displayed different visual nudges during password
creation events, in order to determine whether they ex-
erted any influence over users during password creation.
3 Method
Current efforts to improve password choice focus primar-
ily on the individual. However, situational and contextual
influences could minimise the impact of individually-
focused interventions [31]. Furthermore, social influ-
ence is a strong driver of compliance [11, 35]. Inter-
ventions could conceivably exploit the power of social
norms to influence individual behaviours [4]. Since our
target users in this study were students this context in-
cludes the University and their School. Visual nudge fig-
ures were created beforehand and displayed statically to
ensure that all students saw exactly the same image. A
dynamically-updated image might have confounded re-
sults because participants would then have seen differ-
ent images, confounding our results. We designed one
nudge for each cognitive effect we tested and that has led
to positive results in other research areas.
Due to the exploratory and “in the wild” nature of this
study, we decided to evaluate a range of cognitive effects
with one nudge each, instead of focusing on one effect
and creating several variations of nudges to exert influ-
ence in that one area. If a positive impact resulted, fur-
ther exploration of the effect and variations of the nudge
would be a direction for future research.
3.1 The Nudges
We conducted two studies with a similar experimental
design: In each of the two studies the nudges served as an
independent variable with six levels, a control group that
did not receive any intervention and five different nudge
conditions. From the nudges described below, nudges
N1 to N5 were tested in study 1. Nudges N6 to N8
were tested in study 2 along with a replication of N2 and
N3. The dependent variables were (1) password strength
measured with the strength estimator zxcvbn.js [54]
and (2) password length (for further information see the
Apparatus section). All nudges were presented to the
participants on the registration page of a web-based uni-
versity application that is described in the Apparatus Sec-
tion below.
• N0: Control. The control group was presented with
the standard registration page which asked users to
“Choose a Password”.
• N1: Subconscious Mind. Testing the Priming
Effect. In authentication people are almost al-
ways prompted to provide a new password with
the words: “Choose a Password”. It is possible
that this phrase could be partly responsible for one
of the most common passwords being “password”.
If this admittedly subtle prime is a causative we
ought to be able to influence choice by changing
the word to “secret”, and then see how many par-
ticipants choose the password ‘secret’. Thus, in our
first experimental condition the phrase “Choose a
Password” was replaced with “Choose a Secret”.
• N2: University Context. Testing the Expectation
Effect. Instead of mandating password strength re-
quirements, the participants were shown the static
graphic (Figure 2) that suggests that their password
ought to be stronger than the average password cho-
sen by other students.
Figure 2: Expectation Effect Nudge Graph [37]
• N3: School Context. Testing the Strength of In-
Group Effect. We suggested that participants iden-
tify themselves with students within their school, re-
ferred to as SoCS (Figure 3) in the graphic that was
shown to them.
Some people argue that people do not know how
strong their passwords are. To determine whether dy-
namic feedback reflecting the strength of their passwords
Figure 3: The In-Group Nudge Graph [9]
would make a difference, we superimposed the arrow
shown in Figure 4 over the images in Figures 2 and 3,
giving us conditions N4 and N5. The strength feedback
was based on the same strength estimator zxcvbn.js
[54] that was used to calculate password strength in all
experimental conditions (see section Apparatus for fur-
ther details).
Figure 4: Strength Indicator
• N4: University Context & Feedback. Testing
the combination of the Expectation Effect graph,
with an interactive password strength meter super-
imposed over it. This would theoretically allow the
user to see where on the x-axis their password is
located, in terms of strength, as they entered it.
• N5: School Context & Feedback. Testing the
combination of the In-Group Effect graph, with
same dynamic strength feedback indicator as N4.
• N6: Social Norm. An image of eyes on a wall,
appearing to “watch”, makes people more likely to
pay into an honesty box and also has the potential to
reduce littering [4]. Given the impact of displayed
eyes in other fields we considered it worthwhile to
test whether the perception of being watched would
encourage stronger passwords we displayed a pair
of eyes above the password entry field.
For the final two conditions we asked the participants
to reflect on the strength of their passwords to make them
pause and think about the password. Due to the con-
straints imposed by the ethics committee, no self-report
free-form text was available. Instead, the participants
were asked to rate the perceived strength of their pass-
word on a scale below the Figures as shown in 2 and 3
respectively, giving us conditions seven and eight.
This was intended to drive processing up to the System
2, deliberate level, of processing, to offset the automatic-
ity they might be subject to while choosing passwords.
• N7: University Environment & Reflection. This
treatment displayed the same image as N2, and
asked the user to rate the strength of the password
he or she had just entered. The instruction referred
to them as ‘a student’ in order to highlight their Uni-
versity affiliation;
• N8: School Environment & Reflection. This
group displayed the same image as N3, in addition
to asking the user to rate the strength of their pass-
word. The instruction referred to them as ‘a com-
puting science student’, once again to emphasise
their in-group affiliation.
Apparatus. The nudges were tested using a web-
based university application where students were pro-
vided with coursework deadlines, timetable information
and project allocations. The authentication scheme was
based on standard alphanumeric authentication, i.e. a
username and a password.
We did not enforce a password policy nor a time limit
for password creation as we wanted to test the sole im-
pact of the nudges on password creation. However, the
university where the study took place generally suggests
that passwords should be at least eight characters long
(passphrases are recommended), include at least one
non-letter and should be changed at least once a year).
Access to the system was only possible with a student ID
and from within the campus network. As it was not pos-
sible to install password managers on the lab machines
and the use of personal laptops was not allowed, the use
of password managers was largely avoided. If partici-
pants used a password manager on another device they
would have to enter the stored password manually.
The website was used from October 2014 to April
2015 for Study 1 and from October 2015 to April 2016
for Study 2, thus for two consecutive academic years.
Password strength was calculated with the help of
zxcvbn.js [54]. This in an open-source and JavaScript
strength calculator that uses pattern matching and min-
imum entropy calculation. For this research, the score
metric was used. It delivers a strength value between
0 and 4 that indicates whether the number of guesses
required to break the password is less than 102 (score
0), 104 (score 1), 106 (score 2), 108 (score 3), or above
(score 4) 1. For example, the password “password” gets a
rating of 0, where a password like “bootlegdrench42” is
issued a rating of 4. Hence, the scores are not evenly
spaced, the scale is exponential and the resulting data
therefore ordinal. Password length was measured as the
number of characters used for a password. For privacy
and security reasons the participants’ passwords were
never transmitted unhashed: strength was calculated lo-
cally and the hashed password transmitted to the server.
Sample. All participants were students enrolled in
technical courses, mainly specialising in Computer Sci-
ence that used the web application for their studies. In
Study 1, a total of 587 individuals registered to use the
web application. Some students exercised their right to
opt out, leaving 497 participants taking part in the study.
In Study 2, 816 individuals registered to use the web ap-
plication and created a password, of those 776 partici-
pants took part in the study.
Ethics. The study was conducted in agreement with
the university’s Ethics board. Participants were able to
opt out of the experiment at enrolment, and about 15%
did so. The school management would not allow us to
contact the students to ask any questions because of the
sensitivity and secrecy of passwords, and the fear that
the students would interpret any communication as an
indication that their passwords had been compromised.
For privacy reasons we were not permitted to report any
demographic information. We ensured that we used only
public domain images during the course of this study.
Procedure. The participants were randomly assigned
to the control condition or one of the experimental con-
ditions by a script embedded in the enrolment web page.
They were informed that their actions were being
logged and could be used for research purposes. They
were presented with a consent form, allowing them to
opt out of the experiment, but still benefit from use of
the website. In all experimental conditions, the nudges
were presented above the password entry field during en-
rolment and also during subsequent password creation
events.
4 Results
4.1 Study 1
The data were first analyzed in terms of preconditions
for statistical procedures such as sampling distribution
and missing values. The descriptive statistics of Study 1
are listed in Table 2. The mean is reported as µ , the stan-
dard deviation as σ , the median as x˜ and the interquar-
tile range as IQR. Overall, the average password strength
1https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2012/04/zxcvbn-realistic-
password-strength-estimation/ (accessed 28th September 2017)
NUDGE PROMPT COND
Control ”Choose a Password” N0
Framing ”Choose a Secret” N1
Expectation Graph in Figure 2 N2
In-Group Graph in Figure 3 N3
Expectation & Dynamic Strength Graph in Figure 2 + Figure 4 N4
In-Group & Dynamic Strength Graph in Figure 3 + Figure 4 N5
Social Norms N6
Expectation & Reflection Graph in Figure 2 + Reflection N7
In-Group & Reflection Graph in Figure 3 + Reflection N8
Table 1: Tested Nudges (N = Nudge Condition)
was rated with x˜ = 1 and IQR1 = 0, IQR3 = 3. The dis-
tribution of the password strength scores is depicted in
Figure 5. The average password length was µ = 9.59 (σ
= 3.25) and x˜ = 9. The shortest password comprised 3,
the longest 32 characters.
Figure 5: Password strength Study 1
Due to a non-normal sampling distribution and the
password strength being measured on an ordinal scale,
Mann-Whitney-U tests were conducted to compare each
of the five nudge conditions with the control group. The
tests were run for both password strength and length us-
ing the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure for the correction
of p-values. The effect size was calculated using Cliff’s
Delta [13, 14] which does not make assumptions about
the underlying data distribution.
Password strength in the Priming group (N1, x˜ = 1)
did not differ significantly from the control group (N0, x˜
= 1), U = 3419.00, z = -.351, p = .726, Cliff’s Delta =
.03 [-.14, .2]. We counted two uses of the word “secret”
as password in this group. However, none of the other
participants, who were primed with the prompt “Provide
a password” used the word ‘password’, so there is no
evidence of a strong priming effect.
Likewise, there was no significant difference between
the control group and the conditions In-Group Effect
Strength Estimation Length
Subjects x˜ IQR1 IQR3 min max µ σ x˜ min max
N0 82 1 0 3 0 4 9.46 3.83 8.00 4 32
N1 86 1 0 2 0 4 8.91 2.72 8.50 3 17
N2 83 1 0 3 0 4 9.95 3.51 9.00 6 24
N3 81 1 1 3 0 4 10.33 3.57 9.00 6 22
N4 82 2 1 3 0 4 9.76 2.53 9.00 6 17
N5 83 1 0 2 0 4 9.17 3.01 8.00 6 21
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of user-generated passwords in Study 1 (µ = mean, σ = standard deviation, x˜ = median,
IQR = Interquartile range).
(N3, x˜ = 1), U = 2955.5, z = -1.251, p = .211, Cliff’s Delta
= -.11 [-.28, .06], and In-Group effect with feedback (N5,
x˜ = 1), U = 3272.5, z = -.439, p = .661, Cliff’s Delta =
-.04 [-.21, .13]. Finally, also the comparison between the
password strength of the control group and the Expecta-
tion Effect with feedback group (N4, x˜ = 2) yielded an in-
significant result due to the Benjamini-Hochberg adapted
p-value threshold, U = 2708.00, z = -2.207, p = .027,
Cliff’s Delta = -.19 [-.36, -.02]. The same was true for
the similar condition N2 without feedback (x˜ = 1), U =
3080.00, z =-1.084, p = .278, Cliff’s Delta = -.09 [-.26,
.08]. The effect sizes are graphically depicted in Figure
6.
Figure 6: Effect sizes of the password strength compar-
isons
Password length, among others (such as use of differ-
ent types of characters or of upper and lower cases), can
be one factor contributing to stronger passwords. How-
ever, in line with the findings on password strength no
significant effect on password length could be proven.
4.2 Study 2
The data analysis for Study 2 followed a similar approach
to the one for Study 1. The descriptive statistics of Study
2 can be found in Table 3. Overall, the average pass-
word strength was rated with x˜ = 2, IQR1 = 0 and IQR3
= 3. The distribution of the password strength scores is
shown in Figure 7. The average password length was µ =
10.02 (σ = 2.57) and x˜ = 9. The shortest password com-
prised 4, the longest 25 characters. Similar to Study 1,
Kolmogorow-Smirnow tests and a visual inspection re-
vealed deviations from a normal distribution leading to
the use of nonparametric Mann-Whitney-U tests. From
the original N=776 data sets, 39 had to be excluded due
to technical problems with the java script strength esti-
mator.
Figure 7: Password strength Study 1
Again, the control group was tested against the five
experimental groups N2, N3, N6, N7 and N8 in pair-
wise comparisons using nonparametric Mann-Whitney-
U tests and the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure for p-
value correction. However, the experimental groups did
not differ significantly from the control group, neither in
terms of password strength nor length.
Strength Estimation Length
Subjects x˜ IQR1 IQR3 min max µ σ x˜ min max
N0 124 2 0.25 3 0 4 10.13 2.70 10.00 6 24
N2 124 2 1 4 0 4 10.23 2.56 10.00 6 19
N3 120 1 1 3 0 4 10.06 2.73 9.00 4 25
N6 124 2 0 3 0 4 9.80 2.42 9.00 6 16
N7 121 1 0 3 0 4 9.88 2.24 9.00 6 15
N8 124 1 0 3 0 4 10.02 2.77 9.00 5 17
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of user-generated passwords in Study 2 (µ = mean, σ = standard deviation, x˜ = median,
IQR = Interquartile range).
4.3 Hypothesis
Based on our findings we conclude that H1 is not sup-
ported. The presence of the visual nudges we tested did
not lead to longer and stronger passwords.
5 Discussion & Reflection
Research designs strive to maximize three criteria when
collecting evidence: generalizability, precision, and re-
alism. Since it is impossible to maximize all of these, all
research designs exhibit deficiencies in one or more of
these dimensions [33].
For example, survey research is generalizable whereas
lab experiments are more precise, and field experiments
(and case studies) are realistic while being less precise
due to low controllability of confounding factors. Re-
searchers who utilize laboratory experiments to study se-
curity behaviors can control the environment and fix a
number of research variables, but realism suffers because
this setting only mimics reality. Field experiments are far
more realistic, but are undeniably less precise. Surveys
perform poorly in terms of realism and precision.
The best research projects will probably combine the
findings of surveys, lab experiments and field studies in
order to offset the deficiencies of individual methods. A
number of surveys have been carried out in this area [47],
giving us a measure of generalizability. We contribute
to the field by carrying out and reporting on our nudge-
related field study, adding realism to previous findings.
After the unexpected outcome of our studies we re-
flected on reasons for the eight nudges seemingly making
no significant impact on users’ password choices. The
possible explanations we considered fall into two broad
categories. The first concerns potential methodological
and statistical issues. The second concerns the partici-
pants: their task, aims and perceptions.
(1) Methodological considerations
The strength metric
For the purpose of our study, we decided to measure
password strength with the password strength meter
zxcvbn.js. We made this decision based on the fact that
it was open-source, uses pattern matching and searches
for minimum entropy. However, the score rating pro-
vided by zxcvbn.js, and used in our study, measures
password strength on an ordinal scale with ‘0’ indicating
the number of guesses required to break the password be-
ing less than 102 and ‘4’ assigned to a password requiring
over 108 guesses. The clustering of data into 5 artificial
categories, however, suppressed data variance. For ex-
ample, if the number of guesses to crack a password in
the control group was 1100 and that of a password in one
of the experimental conditions was 9900, both passwords
would be assigned a score of 2 indicating between 103
and 104 guesses required to break the password. Thus,
the difference in the data would not be reflected in the
score.
Although we were not aware of any alternatives when
we commenced our study, there are now wrappers to
run zxcvbn.js completely offsite. We used the open-
source version of the client. To protect the participants’
passwords, we did not transmit unhashed passwords —
strength was calculated locally and the hashed password,
together with its strength rating, transmitted to the server.
The unavailability of the raw data later prevented us from
calculating alternative strength estimations that might
have provided a greater variance and a categorization
closer to the real distribution.
The loss of information negatively affected the anal-
ysis so that it is possible that existing effects were not
detected. We would therefore recommend the use of a
richer classification mechanism for further studies of this
type.
Non-parametric tests
Another issue is that the ordinal password strength scale
required the use of a non-parametric test. In our study,
the Mann-Whitney-U test was conducted for the pairwise
comparisons of the experimental and control groups.
(Non-parametric tests make no assumptions about the
probability distributions of the measured variables, as
compared to parametric tests that require normality.
Non-parametric tests are indicated where the normality
requirement is violated: they are more robust against out-
liers and use characteristics such as the median and the
central tendency to describe a distribution.)
However, if the requirements of parametric tests are
met, the test power of such parametric tests is, gener-
ally speaking, higher than that of non-parametric tests.
Tests with a higher test power are more likely cor-
rectly to reject a null hypothesis (no difference between
groups) when the alternative hypothesis (difference be-
tween groups) is true. In our case, that means that a
test with a higher test power might well have detected
an existing difference between the experimental and the
control groups, which the non-parametric test did not re-
veal. To quantify that potential impact we conducted a
G*Power analysis [19] to compare the test power of an
non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U test to an independent
t-test. We fixed α = .05 and sample size on 80 people
per group similar to the sample sizes in study 1. We
then manipulated the effect size Cohen’s d required by
G*Power to compare the results. We found the changes
in test power to be below 2% (see Table 4).
Thus, the use of non-parametric tests might have con-
tributed to our negative findings. Still, the analysis shows
that the influence of the non-parametric vs. parametric
test is rather small, whereas the influence of the effect
size is much bigger. In our study 1 the effect sizes were
only between .03 and .19. For future studies, it would
therefore be beneficial to use a study design and pass-
word strength metric that offers greater variance and sup-
ports the deployment of parametric tests.
(2) Participant Considerations
Authentication is Complex
The focus of the experiment was solely on the password
choice task. The user’s specific goals and needs, in the
context of the task, might not have been considered suf-
ficiently. This is especially relevant in that security tasks
are often secondary rather than primary goals [55]. De-
pending on the context, users aim to read mails, book
a hotel or check their course details and grades. Many
users might consider authentication a necessary evil that
has to be overcome to reach a primary goal. It is just
one among many elements in the choice-making ecosys-
tem. Thus, it might be that the nudges tested in this
study are not ineffective per se but that they were not
powerful enough in the authentication context. For fu-
ture work it would therefore be important to analyse the
users’ choice-making ecosystem holistically before de-
signing a simple user interface display “intervention” to
nudge users towards a change in behaviour.
Password Strength Perceptions
Studies by Ur et al. [48, 46] found that users’ percep-
tions of what makes a strong password differs from the
actual password security. Users succumb to several mis-
conceptions. For example, many overestimated the secu-
rity benefit of including a digit compared to other charac-
ters and underestimated the decrease in security that re-
sulted from their use of common keyboard patterns. This
might be an indication that users lack the understand-
ing of what specifically contributes to a strong password.
In the context of our results this means that the nudges
might not have sufficiently enhanced the users’ under-
standing of what makes a password stronger. Thus, feed-
back on password strength might be promising direction
for future research.
However, the success of feedback meters in the liter-
ature, that dynamically display password strength to the
user and thus constitute one form of feedback, is mixed.
Studies in which users were not actively prompted to
consider their password reported only marginal effects,
whereas in others the meters weren’t even noticed by
users [7]. This confirms our earlier recommendation that
future studies should engage in analyzing the targeted
users, their tasks and mental models in a holistic way
before designing nudges. Apart from that, one could as-
sume that nudges which not only transport the message
that passwords should be secure but also offer guidance
on how to achieve this, might be more effective. This
assumption, however, needs to be tested.
Password Reuse
People reuse passwords across sites [16, 25], a fact re-
lied on by hackers globally. In a recent study by Wash
and Rader [52] password re-use behaviour was investi-
gated. The authors showed that for important accounts,
such as university accounts, people re-used stronger and
more complex passwords as compared to less important
accounts. Thus, the difference between strong, re-used
passwords (in the control group), and strong “nudged”
passwords (in the experimental groups) might have been
too small to detect. Apart from that, our nudges were
designed to target the password creation process. If par-
Test power
Cohen’s d Sample size α independent t-test Mann-Whitney-U test
0.1 80 0.05 0.1550283 0.1516025
0.2 80 0.05 0.3499859 0.3393193
0.3 80 0.05 0.5965318 0.5796253
0.4 80 0.05 0.8089716 0.7928030
0.5 80 0.05 0.9336887 0.9238465
Table 4: Comparative analysis of test power using the G*Power software [19].
ticipants were reusing passwords they might well have
ignored the nudges altogether, rendering them impotent.
Nudges & Complex Behaviours
Nudges are targeted at at making users change a default
rule or behaviour. This, however, isn’t an easy task. Sun-
stein [42] explains that there are a number of reasons for
users clinging to their default password behaviours de-
spite the presence of nudges.
1. First, changing default behaviour requires active
choice and effort, and the option towards which the
person is being nudged might be more effortful than
the default option. Nudges might be more effective
where people have to choose between two options
that are similar in terms of effort. In authentication,
however, options are seldom similar. A stronger
password increases the cost for the user in terms of
time and memory load. Reusing a password is much
less effortful than coming up with a new one.
2. Second, departing from the default way might be
perceived to be risky and only become a realistic
option if people are convinced that they should in-
deed change their default behaviour.
3. Third, people are loss averse. If the default is
viewed as a reference point, a change might be con-
sidered a loss of routine or long-memorized pass-
words.
4. Fourth, password choice is cognitively expensive
[20], not a simple activity. If people are already
depleted for some reason they are even less likely
to choose a stronger password and a visual nudge is
hardly going to have the power to mitigate this.
In future studies, it would be interesting to test nudges
that offers a benefit in return for the extra perceived ef-
fort. One idea suggested by Seitz, Von Zezschwitz and
Hussmann [45] is to reward users with a stronger pass-
word by allowing them to keep the password longer than
a weak password: applying a strength-dependent aging
policy. Thus, weak passwords would be easier to type
and memorise but would have to be changed more fre-
quently whereas stronger passwords are harder to type
and memorise but could be kept longer.
Limitations
As described above, this study was conducted in the field
with a high degree of realism. However, field studies
lack the controllability of laboratory experiments, even
more so in our case where the requirements of the ethics
committee constrained us in terms of collecting demo-
graphic and additional information to preserve partici-
pant privacy and anonymity.
Furthermore, the use of the password strength scores
that are not evenly distributed resulted in a loss of
variance and a decrease in test power. Future studies
should therefore consider and compare other possibilities
to quantify password strength (also see Methodological
Considerations and Lessons Learned sections).
Another limitation is the limited generalisability of
the sample that predominantly consisted of Computing
Science students. It can therefore be expected that the
sample was somewhat biased towards technically-adept,
young and male participants. Another limitation con-
cerns the design of the Figures that were presented to
the participants in the experimental conditions N2 Uni-
versity Context, N3 School Context and the related con-
ditions N4, N5, N7 and N8. Participants received dy-
namic feedback on their password strength in relation to
the graph in N4 and N5. In N7 and N8 they were asked
to rate the perceived strength of their passwords in rela-
tion to the graph. However, the participants in N2 and
N3 did not receive feedback on their passwords. There,
the nudge was intended merely to create the impression
that the participants’ peer group passwords ought to be
stronger than the average. In retrospect, it seems that
this, on its own, did not have the power to impact pass-
word strength.
Lessons learned
A number of lessons were learned during the course of
this research. We suggest the following implications that
might be useful to security researchers conducting future
studies:
1. First, the categorization of the password strength
based on the zxcvbn.js metric used in our study
resulted in a loss of information and variance of
password strength. It also required the use of non-
parametric tests that, generally speaking, have a
lower test power than parametric tests. It is there-
fore possible that existing small effects were not de-
tected. For future studies, it would be advisable to
explore and compare other metrics, e.g., the exact
number of guesses required to break a password.
2. Second, based on the literature, nudges seem to be
more effective where choices are equal in terms of
effort. Stronger passwords will undeniably require
more effort both in terms of memory load and typ-
ing time and complexity.
3. Third, authentication nudges might not come into
effect when users re-use passwords. Therefore, it
would be interesting either to assess password re-
use as a control variable, or to prevent users from re-
using passwords, e.g. by applying an idiosyncratic
password policy. In this case, the increased memory
load would have to be acknowledged and compen-
sated for in some way and such a policy might well
introduce unanticipated and unwanted side effects.
4. Fourth, to better comprehend participants’ under-
standing of secure password creation, we ought to
conduct further studies exploring their mental mod-
els. It could also be useful to compare different user
groups, such as laypersons and experts, who possess
different levels of knowledge and perhaps engage
in different decision-making strategies. Depending
on the outcome of those studies, nudges that not
only increase awareness, but also offer guidance on
how to create stronger passwords, might be a more
promising approach.
6 Conclusion
The research reported in this paper investigated the via-
bility of a number of nudges in the authentication con-
text. We manipulated the choice architecture to encour-
age the choice of stronger passwords. We discovered
that password strength was not impacted by the visual
nudges.
Having reflected on our findings, we were reminded
of the complexity of the password creation event. It is
influenced by so many more factors than the mere ap-
pearance of the surrounding user interface. We learned
some valuable lessons during the course of this research
and we conclude the paper by presenting a list of these
to assist other researchers wishing to work in this area.
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